A Conversation With President Rashad Al-Alimi of Yemen

President Rashad al-Alimi discusses Yemen’s foreign policy priorities, regional security, and the country’s humanitarian situation.

O’SULLIVAN: Good afternoon. I’m thrilled to welcome you to the Council on Foreign Relations, and to this conversation with Yemen’s President Rashad Al-Alimi. I’m Megan O’Sullivan. I’m the director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University and member of the Board of Directors of the Council on Foreign Relations.

So you have the bio of the president, but I wanted to say a few words because he is—in fact, you’re not going to hear my wonderful introduction of you. Let’s just get this working.

(Pause.)

Fantastic.

I was saying that you are a veteran politician, but also a scholar. And so today you bring to us a conversation with the authority of a president, but also the insights of a scholar. He has been involved in the governance of Yemen for many decades, for nearly forty years, going up through the ranks of the security establishment. And has now, since April 2022, been the president—or, the chair of the Presidential Leadership Council, which is an organization of anti-Houthi political and military groups that are coming together and are recognized by the international community as the legitimate government of Yemen. And in this position, he has been working to stabilize a country that’s been shattered by conflict. And working with international partners and governments to try to address the humanitarian situation, to try to pursue peace, and to try to rebuild Yemeni governance. So please join me in welcoming President Al-Alimi to the Council. (Applause.)

So I’m going to dive right in. And you were here a year ago at the Council, in a very fruitful conversation. It has been a year where a great deal has happened. So I’d like to begin by asking you about the current situation in Yemen. We have a situation where there are so many things happening in the Middle East that Yemen is not in the headlines, as it was some time ago. But the Yemeni people are still suffering from about a decade of conflict. Could you give us a situation update on Yemen, the military and the diplomatic piece, and how the situation is on the ground in Yemen?

(Note: President Al-Alimi’s remarks are made through an interpreter.)

AL-ALIMI: To begin with, thank you very much. I am extremely pleased to be here yet again, for the second time, with you. And to be with this group of scholars, researchers, and politicians who focus on international affairs and international relations. I would like to thank you also for the introduction.

There are those who exceed what I have. And by that, I’m referring to other Yemeni personalities. However, I am part of this society. And I’m part of this tradition. And it was my destiny to shoulder many responsibilities in the past. And here I am today, shouldering this responsibility with my brethren in the leadership, Presidential Leadership Council. It is truly an ominous responsibility for us, particularly in view of what has happened at the hands of the Houthi terrorist organizations that have been supported by the Iranian regime.

Our humanitarian situation can be described, unfortunately, as tragic. There are more than 20 million Yemenis who are under the poverty line, 5 million who have been displaced whether inside in camps or who have been displaced to other countries outside Yemen.

This is a situation to which we have, unfortunately, arrived because of the coup d’etat launched by the Houthi forces against the state. It is an Iranian investment that started early on and this is something that I have said last year here, and this Iranian investment was done with the view to controlling this region and to making it part of the expansionist Iranian strategy and to make Yemen a conflict zone between Iran and between those who Iran deems as its enemies in the world.

The Yemeni people have paid a very high price on all levels. The situation in Yemen today—I believe that a year after my first appearance here before you the world is at least today confident about the narrative of the legitimate government when it comes to the Houthis.

There was a narrative that was highly and widely circulated in the international community that the Yemeni case is a political situation and it can be resolved by dialogue. They did not know that had it not been for the campaign by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Yemen would have been today under the full control of Houthis to Al-Mahrah and the borders of Oman.

The fact of the matter is that this narrative today, this narrative that many have repeated in the international community including the United States, this narrative has changed and the international community has come to fully believe that the terrorist Houthi militias are not only a local threat but it’s—and it’s not a—they’re not a temporary threat but they are a permanent threat and a general threat, and facts have proven to date this narrative that the international community have come to believe today.

What is the situation like today? I say we are in control of over 70 percent of the Yemeni territories. We have armed forces and formed forces ready for a land battle. We are—there is an alliance to support legitimacy between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the UAE and we work to coordinate issues at all levels including the economic, political, and military.

They support us economically. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has lately expressed its interest in supporting the government with $400 million so that we can provide services to Yemenis and live up to our commitments.

I believe that the situation today is ready for us to regain the areas that are currently under the control of the terrorist Houthi forces. They are very sensitive, and they overlook the international passways.

O’SULLIVAN: Let me—thank you. You raise many important things for us to discuss.

Let me first go where I think you were taking us, which is that you’re not seeing the situation as being ripe for peace talks. You’re suggesting that military force is the way to go to change the dynamics. I want to make sure that we’re understanding you correctly. You’ve been an advocate for peace talks and dialogue but is it accurate to say that you don’t see prospects for these talks, whether it’s the Saudis and the Houthis speaking under the auspices of the Omanis or something else? Is this a moment where peace could be made through dialogue or otherwise?

AL-ALIMI: I believe that for the past ten years and since 2014 to date and all successive governments, including the former president, have provided lots of concessions with the hope of arriving at a political solution, and there is a long history of talks—the Peace and Partnership Agreement in Sanaa, and then talks in Kuwait, among other areas, until the international community agreed to the Stockholm Agreement. And this agreement was reached when the Yemeni forces reached the port of Hodeidah, and there was only three kilometers separating the government from the port. The international community forced us to stop. And we were forced to accept the Stockholm Agreements. The Houthis reneged and failed to commit to such agreements.

And we believe that the peace talks, including the roadmap that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia adopted, we agreed. We agreed to it in the Leadership Council. However, the Houthis are the ones who reneged. And they started attacking the oil infrastructure that used to cover 70 percent of our budget. And they started threatening international navigation and maritime ship. We haven’t seen anywhere where civilian ships have been attacked with missiles, in cooperation with—including ISIS and al-Qaida. So all the elements who were imprisoned from ISIS and al-Qaida were recruited to undertake military operations in the oil refinery area.

Therefore, when we talk about peace with this group, this group is a mini, local group, made of displaced persons. And therefore, I believe that it’s difficult to arrive at a peaceful solution unless there are regional and international circumstances that can bring some pressure to bear. And a proof is the classification by President Trump of the Houthis as a terrorist group. This has led to an embargo that deprived the Houthis from the flow of arms to the militias.

And only two months ago we were able to seize huge amounts of arms because, after the fall of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Assad regime in Syria, and due to the inability of the Shia militias to undertake a role in favor of Iran because they believe that Iraq is important as an economic opportunity and a window, I say, all of the above. All of the forces started focusing on the Houthis. And therefore, we believe that peace with these groups is intrinsically linked to the Iranian project in the region, the expansionist project. And therefore, all international organizations should take as a real interest in the peace process.

O’SULLIVAN: As you are suggesting, that changed regional dynamics have a huge impact on Yemen and on the conflict in Yemen. So can you say more about how you see the fact that the Houthis are now taking on a regional role—taking on a role against shipping, as you suggested, firing missiles into Israel, and others—this, as you said, has changed the narrative maybe outside of Yemen, vis-à-vis the Houthis. Does this create an opportunity for you to get a different kind of support for the government in Yemen? Does it change anything materially on the ground for you? Or are there different regional agendas—or the different agendas of the regional actors, has that created more complications for you?

AL-ALIMI: I believe that the regional situation, the fall of Hezbollah and the regime of Bashar Al-Assad, and the terrorist strikes that the Houthis launched against international navigation, as well as launching drones and missiles against Israel on the claim that they are—it’s part of their advocacy and support for Gaza, I believe that these have changed the situation, changed the scene. And therefore we, in the Presidential Leadership Council, must deal with these changes in a way that we can guarantee the achievement of our strategic goals in support of the people so that we can foil this coup d’etat and we bring Yemen to be part of the stability of the region.

O’SULLIVAN: So this gets me to U.S. policy. And you—and here—being here in the United States, I wanted to give you an opportunity to tell us how satisfied you are with current U.S. policy. Is there more that you are looking for from the United States in this changed environment? And if I may ask about the strength of the Houthis, given what has happened in Iran with Iran and the weakening of the Iranian regime, do you see the Houthis as weaker because they can get less support or do you see them as stronger because Iran has lost, basically, all of its other proxies except for the militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen? So two questions: U.S. policy, what changes would you like to see? And then, how you see Iranian support for the Houthis; is it strengthening with the weakening of the regime in Tehran or the opposite?

AL-ALIMI: With regard to the first part of your question, we are grateful to the United States and to President Trump because he reclassified the Houthis as a terrorist group. And this decision, I believe, was a historic decision. And there are—and there is a group of countries like Canada, Australia, and Iceland, I guess, New Zealand, that have classified the Houthis as terrorists, and we are now engaging the EU to follow suit. And there are discussions within the EU to classify these militias as terrorist groups.

And therefore, I believe that today we do want the United States to provide us with more economic support. Unfortunately, we had in the past enjoyed economic support, over a billion dollars annually as relief support, and this has stopped now. And therefore, we now honestly believe that we want the United States to reconsider this position, and we’ve already asked the Department of State and the White House to reconsider this position. We do not want the Yemeni people to be punished because of what the terrorist Houthis and the Iranian regime are currently doing.

The second point is that today we are facing a Houthi danger supported by the Iranians against the Yemenis, against the region, and against the world. Therefore, we need to develop a regional, local, and international approach that is similar to an international alliance to be able to get rid of this group and to regain peace and security in the region. And I believe that the United States is the one that is more capable of taking a leadership role in this alliance in support of the legitimate government to liberate the region that the Houthis control, because this is the only one to support international navigation and to be able to spare the world the drones and the ballistic missiles that are launched by the Houthis.

Iran did not stop. To the contrary, after its hirelings in the region fell, it doubled its investment in Yemen. And we discovered huge amounts of weapons that were recorded by the Sanctions Committee on Yemen, and they have been able to identify weapons that have been infiltrated, that have been brought into Yemen. And they have Iranian markings. They are made in Iran. And those are already in full view of the world, and the United Nations including the Sanctions Committee have identified that.

There are also nowadays—there are nowadays drug manufacturing facilities that were transferred from Syria, for example, in a region called Al-Mahrah, which is under the control of the legitimate government, we discovered that there is a manufacturing plant that is managed by Iran and elements of the Houthis. And there are many other drug manufacturing plants that are—that are present in the Houthi regions and that manufacture drugs in those areas. Therefore, I would say Iran did not stop its support. To the contrary, it has increased its support. And we would not like it to continue to destabilize the region. They are the only ones, meaning the Houthis, who are doing that.

O’SULLIVAN: I think I have time to ask you one more question before we turn to the audience for questions. And I want to underscore what you’ve highlighted a few times in your responses, and that is just the really dire economic situation in Yemen. The World Bank says that Yemen’s economy is basically contracted by half over the last ten years. And, as I think you mentioned, the bombing of the ports have meant that Yemen is unable to export oil, where it got most of its—most of its revenues, to provide support to the population.

And then coupled on this humanitarian crisis, which you underscored, has left tens of millions of Yemenis in need of food and food aid. How are you seeing the ability of Yemen to return back from that kind of economic devastation? And you mentioned the FTO designation, which, of course, was—the Houthis were undesignated by the Biden administration in order to increase the flow of humanitarian aid. Do you see these two things as being in tension with one another? Or do you have some prospect for an alleviation of the humanitarian situation or the economic situation?

AL-ALIMI: With regard to alleviating the economic situation, we are in need of economic support, particularly at this time. The U.S. is called upon, as well as the international community, and the brothers of Yemen in the Gulf region. And there are discussions underway today. I had the director of the Bank—the World Bank. And there is a plan for the Bank, and a way to reconsider discussion with our government. There is the Saudi program to reconstruct Yemen, establishing a fund to support the medical facilities in Yemen. And there are directives by Emir Mohammed bin Salman, the heir to the throne and head of the ministry to renew the hospital in Aden for three more years. And it receives more than two million patients freely. And this has solved a big problem for us. People come from all the governorates to this hospital, including those in places under the control of the Houthis. They come to the hospital.

We have a conference on food security in Yemen adopted by Saudi Arabia in coordination with the GCC, U.S., and EU. There are many projects that are being prepared for reconstruction. There is a conference we are in preparation for. There is a major problem. We have major oil abilities. We can re-export it. The main problem is that the terrorist Houthi group is destroying everything we are trying to do, either by bombarding oil facilities or instructing the cessation of the exportation of oil in Shabwah that comes from Marib. This group, as long as it remains, any effort undertaken by the government, with the assistance of international and regional community, will be incomplete and will be short of achieving its purpose. Therefore, assisting the Yemeni government and its institutions will help us at this moment to create a new society based on justice, equality, democracy, and multilateralism.

O’SULLIVAN: Thank you.

I’d like to open it to people in the audience for questions. I’d like to remind everybody this is an on-the-record conversation. We do have it livestreamed but we’re not taking questions from the virtual audience so I’m reliant on all of you in this room to pose some questions to the president.

I’ll begin over here. Please stand up and introduce yourself before your question. Thank you.

Q: I’m Lucy Komisar. I’m a journalist.

Moving to another part of your region, how would you deal with the Israeli genocide in Gaza?

AL-ALIMI: We condemned Israeli actions in Gaza and this is the position of my government as well as the position of the Yemeni people and civilized society as a whole.

At the same time, we believe that the destruction of facilities in Yemen by Israel is triggered by the actions of the terrorist Houthi group. It threatens international navigation. It sends drones and missiles on the pretext of supporting Gaza.

I stated in the conference—the summit conference—Islamic summit conference in Doha that radicalism serves many sides or parties. I believe that the actions of the armed groups is another facet of the expansionist states in the region.

Our position vis-à-vis Gaza is clear cut and we presented it to the Islamic summit in Doha.

O’SULLIVAN: Thank you very much.

Yes, sir?

Q: Your Excellency, thank you so much for joining us today. My name is Mark Vlasic. I spent time being a TV producer and film producer in Hollywood and a professor at Georgetown, but I spent some time working with Homeland Security investigations, which is a subcompartment of DHS, to work on the seizure and recovery of the largest collection of cultural heritage ever seized and returned to the people of Yemen.

I want to compliment your colleagues because it was very thoughtful to work with the Smithsonian to highlight this. I’d love to hear your thoughts on the importance of cultural heritage to your country. Thank you.

O’SULLIVAN: So is the translation working? Is your translation working?

INTERPRETER: Not. Not. (Laughs.)

O’SULLIVAN: OK. So Mark was asking about the importance of ancient treasures—now I’m getting Arabic—of ancient treasures to Yemen to your cultural identity. Archaeological sites and other things in Yemen.

AL-ALIMI: Thank you for the question, which is very important to Yemen.

As Western researchers say, it is an open museum. The whole Yemen is a museum. Therefore, when the tourists and researchers come to Yemen they tell us that they wander inside a museum throughout Yemen.

Last year I came to the museum and we received a number of archaeological pieces from the wonderful figures that returned these pieces with no return and they acquired them in personal capacity, and we extend our thanks to them as well as our thanks and appreciation to the government of the U.S. and the administration of the museum.

Mr. Tim, the previous envoy of Yemen, part of the ministry for foreign affairs, he helped us. We believe that maintaining heritage is a very important task in which we can participate because the Houthis look for these archaeological pieces. They steal them from the museums and they resell them to whoever buys them.

Therefore, this group is outside logic, ethics, history, and values. Thank you.

O’SULLIVAN: Yes. Over here, please.

Q: Mr. President, thank you so much. My name is Michelle Gavin. I’m a senior fellow here at the Council.

I work, largely, on African issues but I wanted to ask you about Red Sea governance more broadly. There are so many actors involved in asserting influence in the Red Sea and the connections are sometimes quite surprising. I know the Houthis do have a connection to insurgents in Somalia, for example. And so are you satisfied with the institutional mechanisms that exist for managing competing interests in the Red Sea?

AL-ALIMI: I believe the problem is that I’m the weaker party in the equation. The fall of the state and its institutions undoubtedly weakens the national role of any country.

However, today Saudi Arabia and the U.K. adopted a conference for navigation safety and we were very active in Riyadh at that conference. More than thirty ambassadors attended that conference and we introduced a comprehensive plan to reconstruct the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea because we have more than 2,400 coasts.

Ten million dollars have been adopted for repairing the Yemeni coasts and this role is being fostered. Our national role is being fostered every time we strengthen the institutions and reconstruct them. In the Leadership Council for five years in Aden our main purpose is to bring back these institutions and strengthen them to deal with the internal situation and the regional situation and the international situation.

As a result of this effort our plan is in line with this major effort and we look forward to further backing and strengthening. Many summits were held and Yemen used to host these summits, and we need to corroborate these efforts now.

We have a problem with Somalia alliance between the Houthis and Shabaab, which belongs to al-Qaida and Daesh. There is coordination and exchange, and we spotted a number of weapons going from the Houthis to Somalia and we have joint cooperation between us and the Somali government and with the embassy there.

We have cooperation in the field of the security apparatus as well as cooperation with Djibouti and joint action in many areas that—coasts of the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.

O’SULLIVAN: Yes, please.

Q: Sir, I’m Ethan Bronner from Bloomberg.

I wanted to ask you to characterize, if you could, your relationship with the government of Israel. Are you in any contact with them when they attack Houthi sites in Yemen? Do you coordinate in any way with them? You have so much in common and of course, at the same time, as you described what’s going on in Gaza, issues with them. So I wondered if you could talk about your relationship with them. Thank you.

AL-ALIMI: We have no relations with Israel. And we are committed with the League of Arab States resolution with regard to normalization of relation with Israel. Normalization with Israel, according to the Arab states, is committed to applying the international legitimacy resolutions and the two-state. And we are obliged with the League of Arab States and the efforts undertaken by Saudi Arabia and France. And we back this endeavor. We believe that achieving peace in the region is related to the establishment of the two states, and stopping the radicals, the terrorist groups, and preventing Iran, which utilizes the question of Palestine to achieve its own interests in the region. This can only be achieved through establishing the two-state resolution.

O’SULLIVAN: In the back, please? Yes. If you could just wait for the microphone.

Q: Oh. I’m Daniella Cheslow with Politico. Thank you so much for visiting.

I was hoping you could tell us who you’re meeting in the U.S. government. And are you going to Washington? Are you going to be talking to anyone in Congress? Thank you.

AL-ALIMI: We are in touch with the American side at all levels, the Leadership Council or the security cooperation in combating terrorism. Yesterday, President Trump received us, and his wife. I met with President Trump. We just shook hands. And he showed keen interest in the situation in Yemen. We had a short discussion while we were shaking hands. And it was very positive. And we are optimistic that there will be more meetings in the future with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs or members, of the Congress, or other circles. The first lady said yesterday in a short statement: We will invite you to the White House, provided you will be with your wives. Inshallah, we will visit the White House.

O’SULLIVAN: Yes. I think that’s Eric. Hard for me that far.

Q: Eric Pelofsky from the Rockefeller Foundation. Nice to see you again, Mr. President.

I wondered if you might comment on two things. One, the relationship with the United Arab Emirates in Marib and the south, as well as the current role of the Omani government in efforts to bring peace to the region and to your country.

AL-ALIMI: Our ties with UAE? UAE is part of the alliance supporting the legitimacy formed in 2017. Some countries withdrew from that alliance. However, Saudi Arabia and UAE continue to be part of the alliance. And this is what controls our relation with UAE. And it furthers the national government in all fields, economic or energy field. We have many projects carried out more than a month ago. They laid the foundation stone for the solar energy. There was 120 mega in Yemen, and it extends a lot of assistance to us and economy and energy.

With regard to Oman, Oman is a sisterly state and we have common borders with Oman. Oman is playing a role because there is a number of Houthis who live in Muscat. We always call on our Omani brothers to be supporters of the legitimate government and to bear pressure—further pressure to bear on the Houthis, because we believe that the Houthis obtain many benefits through their presence in Muscat. The minister for foreign affairs paid a visit to Muscat and met with the officials the day before yesterday. He met with the minister for foreign affairs of Oman. We are trying to mobilize the international and regional society in a manner that achieves our goals to restore our institution(s) and to stem that trend of the Houthis supported by the Iranians.

O’SULLIVAN: Please.

Q: Mr. President, welcome back to the CFR for the second year. I am Doug Silliman, president of the Arab Gulf States Institute.

You lead, in the Presidential Leadership Council, a very complicated mechanism to run the legitimate government of Yemen, Can you tell us, on what issues—economic, political, social, or military—there is strong consensus in the Leadership Council? And if you’re willing, where do you have the biggest differences within the council?

AL-ALIMI: Thank you for this question.

When the presidential council was established it was established to include many parties, and those parties have a political character. And the political character in traditional societies has a social dimension in most of the cases. At the same time, because of the war we are currently engaged in with the militias—with the Houthis militias, there is a military dimension. And therefore, when the council was established it was established with two purposes in mind: unify all the parties that were against the Iranian project in Yemen, and the second project was for this council to go back to the liberated areas—particularly to Aden, which is the interim capital—and to rebuild the government institutions so that the government can fulfill its role towards the citizens and so that we can give an example in the liberated regions, including our brothers and sisters, our families who are under the Houthis.

There are many challenges and many problems. However, I don’t believe we have other options in the Leadership Council other than try to reach a consensus. And as the declaration on the transfer of power, which is a constitutional declaration, we have to work in the Leadership Council so that we can achieve the maximum possible consensus, and this is what we are all seeking. And there are sponsors of this consensus, five countries—the KSA, the Emirates, the United States, Britain, and France—and they call them the five countries. They were eighteen, but now we only have those five. Those five countries are the sponsors, the guardians of this agreement, and therefore at times we sometimes sit with them and they contribute in trying to resolve some of the thorny issues.

So we start with consensus. If we fail, we go to our brothers KSA and UAE. And if this proves to be difficult, then our brothers or our friends who are further removed in terms of proximity will chip in. So our objective—our objective would be to eliminate the Houthi terrorist groups, to reconstruct the government, and to end the Iranian project in Yemen. And that prompts us to try to tolerate many of the challenges, so that we can reach our ultimate goal and so that we can achieve it as soon as possible. I believe that those challenges will be overcome and that we will be able to lead our ship to safe horizons.

When it comes to political problems with regard to unity and other calls, we have our terms of reference. We have basis for this council. We are exercising power. And then we have issues we have with regard to the executing mechanisms and the national dialogue mechanisms that—the national dialogue that started in 2013, and in which all the parties participated. And therefore, this mechanism for dialogue continues to be our terms of reference. And we today have a strategic objective that we try to achieve. And then we come to negotiate and to start a dialogue with the Yemenis about what form of government they would like. Is it a confederation? Is it a federal state? This is something that we can arrive at eventually.

O’SULLIVAN: I might—waiting for people to ask a few more questions. But I’d like to be a little bit more pointed than Doug was about potential differences within your Leadership Council. So, of course, there is the Southern Transitional Council, which is part of your Presidential Leadership Council. And that group is still advocating for independence in the south of Yemen. How do you imagine that you can accommodate the aspirations of such a group within the context of the overall Yemeni project that you’re discussing?

AL-ALIMI: As I said, I already explained, we have references. We have terms of references and we are agreed. We have the declaration for the transfer of power. This declaration defined the rules and the authority of the—of the Leadership Council, and the authorities that are bestowed on the council itself. And there are exclusive authorities for the council that are also set forth. There is also a partnership agreement among the components. And this decides the partnerships when it comes to the formation of government, to partnership in government institutions, et cetera. Those terms of reference we say we are in agreement on. And we have always to invoke them when there is a problem.

A couple of days ago we have a problem. And we met. And we agreed unanimously that there are two references. One is the declaration of the transfer of power. And the second would be the rules—the guiding rules that the group arrived at. We reached an agreement and we advertised it, we publicized it in a statement. Some people believe that this unity, this thing is not something that we can give up. It is important. It is central. Some others believe that the dialogue called for a federal state. And I am supportive of that approach in the national dialogue. And there are also other calls, coming from more than one place—in the south, in other areas. And those calls—we believe that such calls are discussed in normal—under normal circumstances. Normal circumstances, meaning that we regain authority, we conquer the Hodeidah, and then we discuss other issues. We discuss them. Then this is our situation. This is what we arrived at.

O’SULLIVAN: The president of the Council, Mike Froman.

Q: Your Excellency, thank you for joining us.

One of the things that’s happened since your last appearance here has been the fall of the Assad regime, the rise of al-Sharaa, a fundamental change in Syria. What’s Yemen’s view of those changes? What’s your approach to Syria? And how do you think about the implications of that change for the region more broadly?

AL-ALIMI: Thank you. Thank you for the question. It so happened that on the 8^th of December, which was the day, or the morning where Assad fled Syria, we were in a meeting. It was by coincidence. We were informed while we were meeting that Bashar al-Assad fled, and that that there is a new regime led by someone called Ahmed al-Sharaa. We entered into a discussion. We cannot come out of the meeting without having a pronouncement on the issue. The Assad regime did two things when it comes to Yemen. First, it handed over our embassy in Damascus to Houthi militias and expelled our ambassador from Damascus. He and Iran were the only two who did that. Even the Iraqis didn’t do it. Our ambassador continues to be an ambassador in Iraq.

The second thing that the Assad regime did was that all the Houthi elements used to travel to Iran through Syria. There are no visas according to Arab agreement. So they can enter Yemen. We can enter Syria. So the Houthis would go in the thousands to Syria. And then they would go to the southern area, southern Dahieh region of Beirut, for military exercises and for training. And some of them would proceed to Iran, and without visas. I was a minister of internal—of the interior. And they used to—when they used to come, we would look at their passports and there is no Iranian visa stamp. Then we got to know that those people go to Iran to be trained.

So for us, the Assad regime was disastrous. It actually contributed to the fall of the state and to the displacement of Syria—of Yemen, excuse me. So therefore we started discussing what would be the next steps. We took a decision before any other country, including Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, the Gulf states, Egypt, et cetera. We took a decision. We took a decision that we have to support this regime, regardless of its nature. And any regime that comes after Bashar al-Assad’s regime would be worse than that regime. And we said that we congratulate—and, actually, I had a tweet. We congratulated the Syrian people on the fall of the of the regime. And we congratulate them on the fact that Syria went back to the Arab environment, and got liberated from Iran. And we were the first country to declare that.

President al-Sharaa, when we met in the summit, that’s exactly what he told me. He said, we thank you. You were the first state to declare your position in our support, before any other country. Countries took about twelve to fourteen hours for them to declare their support. We expressed our support right away, because the Assad regime destroyed the Yemenis, destroyed Yemen. And therefore, any regime that would replace it would definitely be better.

O’SULLIVAN: Yes, please. In the front.

Q: Thanks. Doron Weber from the Sloan Foundation.

Have the Houthis received any support either from Russia or China? And if not, how do you account for their extraordinary battlefield success? I mean, they’ve withstood—the Saudis, the UAE, Israel, and the United States have all attacked them. They’re still fighting. Iran collapsed like a paper tiger. And you have this very formidable-seeming force that it looks to me like they’re making an argument for being a power in their own right. So what am I missing? I mean, I’m not an expert. From the outside, it looks like they’re very hard to subdue.

AL-ALIMI: First, with regard to China and Russia, in the Leadership and Government Council we are keen on supporting our case, and we are interested not to make our case as a bargaining chip for any party. Therefore, I went to Moscow and we explained our views to Mr. Putin. He understood the situation, but he also was very clear and candid on this score. We tried, as well as the Emirates and Saudi Arabia tried, with the Russians. This led to positive results to cease any military support for the Houthis. We have a problem with China because we discovered Chinese-manufactured weapons. And minister for foreign affairs will go back, and we will summon the Russian ambassador and discuss the matter with them.

And the Presidential Leadership Council, we want to keep the unity of the international community, and we consider Resolution 2216 as the roadmap to solve the question of Yemen. It is one of the best resolutions adopted by the Security Council to restore the state and the coup d’etat.

O’SULLIVAN: (Off mic)—perhaps for one more.

Q: Thank you very much. Chris Isham with CT Group.

A follow up—a quick follow up on the question on Oman. There have been indications for years that Oman has been an important transshipment point for weapons to the Houthis. Have you seen any reduction in that? Has the government of Oman taken steps to reduce that, or has that just flow continued?

AL-ALIMI: As a matter of fact, there were weapons flowing from Oman and we dialogued with our Omani brothers on this matter, and they always said that these were transit commodities and they are not subject to inspection. But international and regional pressure perhaps had an impact in limiting these transships.

We also intensified the security and military groupings, as well as the security of the borders. A week before my departure, I directed the chief and the minister of defense to secure the desert lines coming from Oman because it is a desert and it is difficult to cover them. Perhaps they need battalions, whole battalions to cover these areas. Rub’ al Khali is an open area and the smugglers know these places. And this curbed to a great extent the smuggling. The measures taken at the level of the havens and the ports led to positive results.

With regard to the ships, they came to Hodeidah port, to the Houthis, and it was inspected by the U.N., UNVIM. There is a venue there, and its main purpose is to inspect these shipments. We discovered—as well as the Americans and the EU—discovered that shipments went to al-Hodeidah Port and they were not inspected. There was a shortcoming from the U.N., but the American and international pressure on the U.N. led to accurate inspection, as well as the sanctions imposed by the USA on the entities and the persons who finance the Houthis from the Iranian oil, because it is given with no cost. They take the oil. They sell it. And then they finance their military projects. Efforts are underway. And I am satisfied with them. Last year, when I was here, the situation was not like it is now. Today, we are much better. The USA had the cardinal role in what we have achieved so far.

O’SULLIVAN: (Inaudible.) Thank you very much. (Applause.) Very much appreciate the chance to speak with you. (Applause.)

(END)

This is an uncorrected transcrip